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86 OR 1100*
ARTHUR JOHN KEEFFE, TORRANcE BROOKS AND WILLIAM

J.

GREER

"The court of appeals shall have the power, from time to time, to
prescribe by rules, for the courts of this state, the forms of process,
writs, pleadings and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil
actions and proceedings at law and in equity."This statute has been introduced in the New York State Legislature at
each of the last two sessions, and will, no doubt, be introduced again at the
next session. The proposal has been patterned after the Act passed by
Congress in 19342 which gave the Supreme Court the power to promulgate
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect in 19383 and made
sweeping reforms in the rules of procedure.4
*With the undisclosed aid of Messrs. Brooks and Greer, Professor Keeffe used most
of the material in this article as the basis for an unreported address before the Federation of the Bar of the Sixth Judicial District meeting at Oneonta, N. Y., on September 7, 1946. The address was entitled "Should the Court of Appeals be Given RuleMaking Power?"
lProposed as § 52-a of the N. Y. JuDIIARY LAW, and introduced in the Senate on
January 22, 1946 (No. 519, Int. 507)
"Court of appeals may make civil rules of procedure, for the courts of this state.
1. The court of appeals shall have the power, from time to time, to prescribe by rules,
for the courts of this state, the forms of process, writs, pleadings and motions, and the
practice and procedure in civil actions and proceedings at law and in equity. Said rules
shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.
"2. Said rules shall be reported to the legislature within ten days of the beginning
of the regular session thereof next succeeding the adoption of said rules. Except as
amended or rescinded by the legislature at such session, said rules shall take effect
after the close of such session and upon completion of publication in accordance with the
provisions of section fifty-two hereof, or such later date is may be specified in said
rules. Thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.
"3. Nothing in this act shall abridge the right of the legislature to amend or rescind
such rules.'
248 STAT. 1064 (1934), 28 U. S. C. §§ 723(b), 723(c) (1940).
328 U. S. C. § 723(c) following; 308 U. S. 645 (1939).
4
Medina, Current Developments in Pleading, Practice and Procedure in the New York
Courts (1945) 30 CORNELL L. Q. 449, in which the writer comments at page 464:
"Fortunately, there is now, and has been for some years, an increasing demand for
placing the rules of procedure under the control and supervision of the Court of Appeals.
This is where the power to make such rules should reside. The experience with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted by the Supreme Court after the most careful and exhaustive study, and then at infrequent intervals amended ,in an orderly and
systematic fashion, is a most valuable and rjassuring guide.
"It is my hope that the Bar, as a whole, will place itself solidly behind this most
desirable and substantial reform.' See also Moscowitz, Trends in Federal Law and
Procedure (1946) 21 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 1, in which Judge Moscowitz said at page 27:
"I believe that the federal courts by and large have made greater strides than most
of the state courts in withdrawing from bonds of tradition and antiquated practices. The
Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure are undoubtedly the most notable of these
advances." See W. C. Chestnut, Improventents in Judicial Procedure (1943) 17 CONN.
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Since the coming of the Federal Rules, the American Law Institute in
1942 presented to the profession its Model Code of Evidence which makes
comparable advances in the law of evidence. 5
Adoption of the present proposal, therefore, would permit a general revision of the adjective law of the State of New York that could utilize the
best features of both the Federal Rules and the Model Code of Evidence.
If this proposal is passed, it will vitally affect every member of the legal
profession within New York State, and mark the beginning of a new era
in procedural reform.
No one can look at the present scheme of legislative regulation, the
cumbersome and out-moded Civil Practice Act, without coming to the conclusion that this reform is necessary.
Defend if you can the following five aspects of the adjective law of New
York.
I.
Terence Kelly owned one of the finest saloons in the City of New York.
One day he died. His saloon and his other property were claimed by his
beloved mother and an alleged girl friend who said she was his common
law wife. A contest developed between Kelly's family and this young
lady. In order to establish her case in the probate court, the young lady
put her mother on the witness stand, who testified that every night after his
saloon was closed Kelly would come to their home and in the -morning
before he left she would prepare his breakfast. When Kelly's -own mother
then took the stand to tell the court that this was utterly false, how her son
Terence had been a good boy, how every night after his saloon was closed
he came home to her, and how, of course, she always prepared his breakfast,
she was excused. The ruling of the Probate Court was that the mother of
the alleged common law wife should be heard, but the mother of the son
could not. In the eyes of the law, "Kelly's mother is an interested witness
this was the
and a liar. On appeal, the highest court in the state agreed that
6
correct application of Section 347 of the Civil Practice Act.
B. J. 238,; Charles E. Clark, The Challenge of a New Federal Procedure (1935) 20
CORNELL L. Q. 443; Note (1943) 18 TEMsip. L. Q. 145. See also Green, To What
Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power Prescribe Rules of Evidence (1940)

26 A. B. A. J. 482.
5
MoDEL CoDE OF EvIDENci (1942) adopted and promulgated by the American Law
Institute. It is the work of: Edmund Morgan, Wilbur Cherry, Lawrence Eldredge,

William Hale, Augustus Hand, Learned Hand, Mason Ladd, Henry Lummus, John
Maguire, Charles McCormick, J. Russell McElroy, Robert Patterson, Charles Wyzanski. John H. Wigmore was Chief Consultant.
6

Matter'of Kelly, 238 N. Y. 71, 143 N. E. 795 (1924).
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Put yourself in the place of the lawyer for the mother of Terence Kelly
and see how difficult it would be for you to sit down and explain to her
that Section 347 of the Civil Practice Act, passed by the legislature in 1877,
is to blame for her not being allowed to testify . Can anyone criticize her for
not understanding? She leaves your office blaming you, the legal profession,
and the court for this unjustifiable result.7
II.

In divorce actions the courts, following the mandate of the statute,'
have enforced the prohibition against allowing either spouse to testify against
the other, except to prove the marriage or disprove the allegations of adultery.
The operation of the rule is illustrated in Reiersan v. Reierson:
"The plaintiff had received information and become suspicious that
the defendant was guilty of infidelity to the marital relation; and for the
purpose of satisfying himself in this regard, and of obtaining proof
of the fact if the same existed, upon the night of the 24th of October,
1897, he procured two men to accompany him to his house, and the
three concealed themselves in a barn upon the premises, where they re7

These so-called dead man statutes have been attacked by every writer in the field

of evidence. Any argument for these statutes was exploded by a study of the Commonwealth Fund. See LAW

OF

EviDENc-INTEmRSTm

SuRvivoRs (Commonwealth

Fund,

1927) 23. Their arguments against these statutes are:
(1) That interested survivors will be subjected to an irresistible temptation to perjury is contrary to experience and presupposes that most witnesses are not only so
corrupted by their interests that they will perjure themselves for it, but also so adroit
as to deceive courts and juries. Such a contention underestimates the power of cross-

examination and disregards the fact that if human nature is so depraved, parties will
have little difficulty in finding a disinterested witness ready and willing to furnish the
requisite proof.
(2) To oppose the admission of such evidence because it would greatly imperil the
estates of the dead, is to argue that it is more important to save dead men's estates
from false claims than to save living men's estates from loss by lack of proof. It overlooks the fact that court and jury will inevitably scrutinize with great care the testimofiy of the survivor under such circumstances.
(3) The assertion that public sentiment would not tolerate a rule making the
survivor entirely competent is a prediction which experience in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island has demonstrated to bd false.
(4) The ordinary statute excluding the testimony has proved to be extremely cumbersome and difficult of application, with 'a resulting volume of litigation.
(5) Actual experience by the bench and bar with a rule admitting this testimony
is the best proof of its desirability. The results of a questionnaire submitted to the
bench and bar of Connecticut demonstrated that opposition to the statute allowing the
testimony of interested survivors is in inverse ratio to experience with the statute.
For the expression of similar views see: 2 WIGMoRE, EVIDnXCE (3d ed. 1940) § 578;
Ladd, The Dead Man Statute: Some Further Observations and a Legislative Proposal
(1941) 26 IowA L. Rv.207; Taft, Will Contests in New York (1930) 30 YALE L. J.
593. 605.
8N. Y. Crv. PpAc. Acr § 349.
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mained for some little time. At this time there was in the plaintiff's
house, in company with the defendant, one Gully (who is charged as
co-respondent in the action), a man named Wilson, and a servant girl.
After remaining in the barn for a time, the plaintiff effected an entrance
into the rear of the house with the assistance of Wilson, then in the
house; and he and his two companions entered, and concealed themselves therein. A little time thereafter, the defendant went upstairs to
her bedroom, and, as the evidence tended to disclose and the verdict
'of the jury has established, called for Gully to come upstairs. Gully
responded to the invitation, and proceeded to the defendant's sleeping
room, where she was undressed and in bed. After waiting a few minutes, the plaintiff and his two companions entered the sleeping room of
the defendant, struck a match, and discovered Gully and the defendant in the act of adultery upon the bed." 9
On appeal the court held that the trial court was "entirely justified in
withdrawing from the consideration of the jury the averments of the commission of adultery upon the part of the plaintiff" because Section 831 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (now Section 349 of the Civil Practice Act)
prohibits such testimony. Fortunately the plaintiff had hired two witnesses
to accompany him. If he had accidentally discovered the defendant in this
same act when alone, he would have been without evidence, since to permit
a husband to testify against his wife would destroy confidence and produce
marital discord. 10
This is our present law which no one can justify." To paraphrase one
932 App. Div. 62, 63, 52 N. Y. Supp. 509 (2d Dep't 1898).
10
RicHARDsoN, EVIDENCE (6th ed. 1944) § 510; Admire v. Admire, 180 Misc. 68,
42 N. Y. S. (2d) 755 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
115 BENTHAm, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (London, 1827) 327-345. Bentham
effectively exposes the incongruities of the marital privilege:
"The law will not suffer the wife to be a witness for or against her husband: this
is a proposition put by a reporter into the mouth of the first Earl of Hardwicke. 'The
reason is... to preserve the peace of families: and therefore I shall never encourage
such a consent.' Here, by good fortune, we have a distinct proposition, with an assignable author, and he of the first degree of professional respectability....
"Two men, both married, are guilty of errors of exactly the same sort, punishable
with exactly the same punishment. In one of the two instances (so it happens), evidence
sufficient for conviction is obtainable, without having recourse to the testimony of the
wife; in the other instance, not without having recourse to the testimony of the wife.
While the one suffers,--capitally, if such be, the punishment,-to what use, with what
consistency, is the other to be permitted to triumph in impunity?
"The film of prejudice once removed, a very loose system of morality, or rather (to
speak plainly) a system of gross immorality, will be seen to be at the bottom of these
exemptive rules. The very crime which it punishes in one man-punishes even with
death-it affords its protection to in another. It converts, or seeks to convert, the
house of every man, into a nursery of unpunishable crimes. The same age of barbarism
and superstition, the same age of relaxed morality, which gave birth to the institution of asylums, gave birth (there seems reason to think) to this privilege, which gives
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judge: a woman in bed with a strange man is in a very unfavorable situation to insist upon preserving inviolate the sacred concord of marriage, and
2
harmony and confidence on the part of her husband.1
III.

A few years ago the city council of the City of New York heard that
more patients were dying in one of the City's hospitals than the city fathers
thought proper. In order to investigate the charges of negligence and maladministration, the city fathers began an investigation and sought to subpoena the doctors and records of the hospital to inquire about the diagnosis
and treatment of patients in that particular hospital. 'The investigation was
blocked. The Court of Appeals' 3 said that it would be a violation of the
to each man a safe accomplice in his bosom. The mischievousness of the domestic
asylum goes, however, far beyond that of the asylum commonly called....
"A rule like this, protects, encourages, inculcates fraud....
"It debases and degrades the matrimonial union; converting into a sink of corruption
what ought to be a source of purity. It defiles the marriage-contract itself, by tacking
to it in secret a license to commit crimes....
"Oh! but think what must be the suffering of my wife, if compelled by her testimony to bring destruction on my head, by disclosing my crimes! -Think? answers
the legislator; yes, indeed, I think of it; and, in thinking of it, what I think of besides, is what you ought to think of it. Think of it as part of the punishment which
awaits you, in case of your plunging into the paths of guilt. The more forcible the
impression it makes upon you, the more effectually it answers its intended purpose....
"To the legislators of antiquity, the married state was an object of favour: they'
regarded it as a security for good behaviour: . . . Such was the policy of the higher

antiquity. The policy of feudal barbarism, of the ages which gave birth to this immoral rule, is, to convert that sacred condition into a nursery of crime ...
"The reason now given, was not, I suspect, the original one. Drawn from the principle of utility, though from the principle of utility imperfectly applied, it savours of a
late and polished age. The reason that presents itself as more likely to have been the
original one, is the grimgribber, nonsensical reason,-that of the identity of the two
persons thus connected. Baron and feme are one person in law. On questions relative
to the two matrimonial conditions, this quibble is the fountain of all reasoning.
"Among lawyers, among divines, among all candidates setting up for power in a rude
age, working by fraud opposed to force, scrambling for whatever could be picked up of the
veneration and submission of the herd of mankind,-there has been a sort of instinctive
predilection for absurdity in its absurdest shape. Paradox, as far as it could be forced
down, has always been preferred by them to simple truth....
"All these paradoxes, all these dull witticisms, have this in common,-that, on taking
them in pieces, you find wrapped up, in a covering of ingenuity, some foolish or knavish,
and in either case pernicious, lie. It is by them that men are trained up in the degrading habit of taking absurdity for reason, nonsense for sense. It is by the swallowing of such potions, that the mind of man is rendered feeble and ricketty in the morning of its days. To burn them all, without exception, in one common bonfire, wouldbe a triumph to reason, and a blessing to mankind." See also 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
(3d2 ed. 1940) § 2239; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942) Rule 216.
t United States v. Bassett, 5 Utah 131, 136, 13 Pac. 237, 241 (1887).
13
Matter of New York City Council v. Goldwater, 284 N. Y. 296, 31 N. E. (2d)
31 (1940) ; Note (1941) 26 CORNELL L. Q. 482.
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medical privilege to permit the city to inquire from its own doctors in its
own hospital how they were treating patients. The confidential relationship
between doctors and patients would be violated. 14 The court was required
by the statutory mandate (Section 352 of the C. P. A.) to deny to a legislative committee, whose avowed purpose was to uncover abuses, the right
to ascertain the facts, perhaps vitally necessary for the protection of tfie public of the City of New York.
IV. and V.
The present motion system in New York makes it possible for an attorney
who does not desire a decision of the controversy on the merits to keep delaying the action by making motions until he is able to either exhaust the
other party or secure a compromise settlement3 5 If the action can be delayed long enough there is always hope that the other party will give up or
lose his case through the loss of material evidence or key witnesses.
Besides being permitted to make numerous motions, each delaying the
action during the time the motion is coming up for a hearing, the moving
party is allowed the unlimited right of appeal on corrective motions. 6 , This
makes it possible for this ridiculous situation to occur.
For example, A sues B for breach of contract and on Jan. 1 serves the
summons. On Jan. 21, A 'serves the complaint. Feb. 10, B applies ex parte
for an order to show cause for a 20 day extension of time to answer or move.
March 2, B gets a further extension of 20 days. March 22, B moves to make
the complaint more definite and certain and to separately state and number.
April 22, B loses and appeals to the Appellate Division. June 1,
B has finally' prepared the appeal papers but wants the summer to brief.
,Dec. 1, B's motion is finally denied on appeal and he is directed to
answer in 10 days. Dec. 10, B now moves to strike part of the complaint as
14That adherence to this privilege may create great injustices see: 8 WG ,ORE, Evi(3d ed. 1940) § 2380a (He denounces the privilege as an injury to justice onehundred fold greater than any injury which might be caused by disclosure.)
5
1 "The energies of atforneys and counsel and clients, their time and labor, are devoted to these statutory proceedings instead of being addressed to the trial of the case.
Pending the disposition of the multitude of motions which it is possible to make, and
which in number are often in inverse proportion to the merits of the case, the final
disposition of the case is postponed. Serious and long-continued delay is the result
in many cases. Witnesses die or leave the jurisdiction. Their memories become vague
and the establishment of facts becomes more difficult. Suitors become tired and discouraged, or their means are exhausted. Conditions change, and the relief, when attained, is often deprived of much of its value." Taken from an address by Elihu Root,
President of the New York State Bar Ass'n (1911) 34 N. Y. S. BAR ASS'N REP.
87, 692.
1 N. Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT §§ 609, 610.
DENCE
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irrelevant under Rule 103. Jan. 10, the motion is heard and argued and denied. B then turns to see what else he can do to delay coming to the merits.
Perhaps he can now move to the federal court, giving him as much as 60
days delay at once.
All corrective motions should be made at once and there should not be
an unlimited right of appeal.' 7 Contrast the New York motion practice with
Federal Rule 12(b) iWhich requires that the answer be served within 20 days,
but allows one corrective motion which must contain all objections to the
pleadings. There is no appeal on this motion.' 8 In case the motion is made,
10 additional days are given to answer. However, any matter which could
be the subject of a motion may be pleaded in the answer. One critic has suggested that even this one omnibus motion in the federal procedure should
be abolished and defendants forced to include motion objections in their
19
answers.
The Remedy
The above illustrations, which could be multiplied, point out instances
where the courts under the Civil Practice Act are obliged to do injustice.
Any correction now requires legislative action. Although many eminent lawyers are members of the judiciary committee of the legislature, their time and
energies must necessarily be spent on matters other than securing the passage
of bills designed to correct numerous minor defects in the operating procedure of the courts.
The legislator who is not a lawyer does not know, nor does he care, about
these proposed changes. There is no reason why he should, for he has more
17
"The attainment of justice is delayed until it often amounts to a denial of justice,
the honest suitor is discouraged, the dishonest man who seeks to evade his just obligations is encouraged to litigate for the purpose of postponing them. Such a condition
is not sporadic and occasional. It is continuously recurrent. It is the result of a natural
tendency which appears whenever the conduct of affairs in any branch of the social
life of man is entrusted to a particular class of men specially qualified for that special
work by learning and skill beyond the great body of their fellows. The conduct of
such affairs by such a class becomes an art. The art becomes a mystery. Rules and
formulas originally designed as convenient aids to the attainment of ultimate ends
become traditions and dogmas, and belief in their importance supercedes the object
which they were originally meant to subserve. Special training develops intellectual
acuteness and fine and subtle distinctions. The sense of proportion is lost and the
broad, simple, direct methods which alone 'are really useful in helping plain people
to attain the substantial objects of practical life become entangled in a network of
form and technical refinements." This comment, relating to court practice under the
Code of Civil Procedure, applies to motion practice under the Civil Practice Act. Root,
Reform of Procedure (1911) 34 N. Y. S. BAR Ass'x REP. 87, 89.
2843 STAT. 936 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 225 (1940).
9
1 Clark, Some Problems Concerning Motions Under Federal Rule 12(b) (1943) 27
MruN. L. REv. 415, 3 F. R. D. 146.
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important and more interesting functions in formulating broad matters of
policy. He can not be expected to learn court procedure, to learn the mischief
of the present procedure, and then to learn the proposed remedy in order
20
to properly evaluate the proposal.
The proper place to argue the merits of a proposed change in court procedure is before the court itself. It is part of its business to know the existing procedure and its abuses. Another advantage of court rules is that the
rules are interpreted by those who make them. Consequently, the responsibility for deciding a law suit on a technical point of procedure instead of
deciding it on the merits then cannot be placed on the, legislature. Rules of
court have a tendency to make procedure subsidiary to substantive law.
The simplicity of the Federal Rules presents an encouraging contrast to the
voluminous Civil 'Practice Act. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain
only 86 rules covering a field which requires over 1100 sections in the New
York Civil Practice Act. 21 This simplification of the rules of practice and procedure in the courts is especially helpful to the litigant of small means. Wellto-do litigants can afford to hire lawyers to haggle over procedural problems,
but the man of small means must be able to get justice speedily and at the
least possible cost, or justice will be denied him.
Judge Rodenbeck of Rochester, writing in the Cornell Law Quarterly
in 1916 said:
"Where the procedure is regulated by statute the courts are powerless to deviate from the rules thus laid down and the procedure must
necessarily become a matter of right. That system also enables the courts
to avoid coming to the merits of a controversy and is productive of
delays by multiplying adjudications upon matters of procedure. It is
easier to decide questions of procedure than to pass upon the rights of
the parties. It is for these reasons that we have had so much procedural law under the present system of statutory regulation of procedure. The system of statutory rules also encourages a resort to other
means for deciding controversies between citizens. The growth of committees and boards of arbitration are an evidence of the insufficiency
of
22
the courts and a protest against the existing court procedure."
One of the most persuasive arguments for permitting courts to formulate
rules of procedure is that technical complexities created by the legislature
are driving clients away from the courthouse to seek adjudication by referees
and administrative tribunals. Consider, for example, the voluminous litiga20

See Pound, The Rule Makbg Power of the Courts (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 599, 602,10213. A. J. S. 113, 118.
Mitchell, Reform in. Judicial Procedure (1938) 24 A. B. A. 3. 197.
22
Rodenbeck, The New Practice in New York (1916) 1 CORN LL L. Q. 63, 66.
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tion carried on by the State Industrial Board (Workmen's Compensation
Commission). Very early in the history of that Board the Court of Appeals
upheld the admission of hearsay evidence before it.2 Administrative law
practice is modernized; court practice is left behind the times. The Court
of Appeals is powerless to correct any of the oddities in the various exceptions to the hearsay rule which need revision, 24 making it more desirable to
try actions before administrative tribunals.
Speaking at Denver in September of 1916"Roscoe Pound put it this way:
"We can vouch a generation of experience in England, the experience of the federal equity rules, the experience of the federal administration rules, the experience of the rules in bankrupcy and in copyright,
and the experience of administrative tribunals throughout the.land, to
each of which a full control of its procedure through exercise of a rulemaking power has regularly been conceded. Indeed, it is a curious
anomaly that the legislatures and the bar have been quite willing to
allow administrative boards and commissions, tribunals manned by laymen and provided with little or no substantive law, a free hand to shape
their own procedure by giving them the rule-making power of the
common law judge, while insisting that the courts, manned by trained
judges, accustomed to refer their every action to legal principles, and
provided with an elaborate apparatus of substantive law, be held down
by detailed procedural legislation. One would think that if either were
to be given some scope for doing things efficient in its own way, as dictated by experience, it would be the courts; that if either needed the
procedural strait-jacket of a statute it would be the administrative
commission."' 2 5
The statute authorizing the Supreme Court to make rules was passed in
1934.26 It was first advocated in 1906 in an address by Dean Roscoe Pound
23

Matter of Altschuller v. Bressler, 289 N. Y. 463, 46 N. E. (2d) 886 (1943) in which

the Court of Appeals enlarged upon the dictum in Matter of Carroll v. Knickerbocker
Ice Co., 218 N. Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507 (1916) to sustain the Industrial Board's finding
based entirely on hearsay testimony and corroborated only by the absence of any direct
evidence to the contrary; Matter of Theodore Gallagher v. Mundett Cork Co., 295
N.2 4Y. 576, 64 N. E. (2d) 283 (1945). See N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENsATION LAW § 118.
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942) 223:
"The fact is, then, that the law governing hearsay today is a conglomeration of inconsistencies developed as a result of conflicting theories. Refinements and qualifications
within the exceptions only add to its irrationality. The courts by multiplying exceptions
reveal their conviction that relevant hearsay evidence normally has real probative value,
and is capable of valuation by a jury as well as by other triers of fact."
5 WIIIORp, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 1576 (He comments favorably at page 441 on
the Massachusetts statute prohibiting the exclusion of a deceased's declaration because
it 25
is hearsay.) See MASs. GEN. LAws 1920, c. 233, § 65.
Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 599, 602,
10 J. A. J. S. 113, 118. See Pound, Regulation of Judicial Procedure by Riles of Court
(1915)
26

10 ILL. L. REV. 163.

See note 2, supra.
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before the American Bar Association.2 7 A special committee of the American
Bar Association was formed to secure the enactment of the necessary enabling act to authorize rule-making powers for the court. 28 This committee
continued its efforts from 1911 to 1933 when it was felt that it would be
impossible to do anything further at that time.2 9 However, a year later, the
new Attorney General, Homer S. Cummings, championed the cause and was
able to secure passage of the necessary legislation as part of his program
for reorganizing the Judicial Department. 30 Many eminent judges and
scholars were identified with this movement which secured the rule-making
power for the Supreme Court.3 ' They included such names as Roscoe
Pound, Ex-president Taft,32 Elihu Root, judge Alton Parker, Mr. Justice
McReynolds, Henry Wade Rogers, Moorfield Storey, Frank B. Kellogg,
Samuel Williston, Joseph Beale, Louis Brandeis, and Charles E. Clark. The
proposal was approved by Presidents Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt
and endorsed by Attorneys General McReynolds, Gregory, Palmer, Stone,
and Sargent. Presidents Taft and Coolidge considered it of sufficient importance to include their approvals in messages to Congress. It was endorsed by forty-six State Bar Associations, including the New York State
Bar Association, 3 the Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State
Laws, the executive committee of the Association of Law Schools, the United
States Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Credit Men, the
Commercial Law League, the National Civic Federation and the Southern
Commercial Congress. It was approved by present or former deans of many
important law schools, including Harvard, Yale, Cornell, and Virginia.
The Supreme Court appointed an advisory committee to aid it in the
formation of the rules.3 This committee, composed of leading members of
the bar, 5 formulated the rules and submitted them to the Court. With
2T

Supreme Court Adopts Rules for Civil Procedure in Federal District Courts (1938)

24 A. B. A. 3. 97, 99.

28(1912) 37 A. B. A. REP. 35, 434-436. See Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-Making
Power to the*Supreme Court of the United States (1934) 32 Mcir. L. REv. 1116.
29Suprente Court Adopts Rules for Civil Procedure in Federal District Courts (1938)
24 A. B. A. J. 97, 104.
3O1bid.
3
lCummings, Inmmediate Problems for the Bar (1934) 20 A. B. A. 3. 212 (A list
of3 names of those identified with the movement is set forth in this article.)
2See Taft, The Delays of the Law (1908) 18 YALE L. J. 28, 32; Taft, Possible and
Needed Reforms in the Administration of Justice in the Federal Courts (1922) 47

A. B. A. RE-P. 250, 260-269.
83(1913) 38 N. Y. S. BAR Ass'N REP. 100.
34
Orders of the Court dated June 3, 1935 (295 U. S. 774) and February 17, 1936 (297
U. S. 731). See also Continuance of the Advisory Committee, January 5, 1942 (314

U. S. 720).

35The Supreme Court of the United States appointed an advisory committee of fifteen
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minor changes, these were accepted by the Court and have now become the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
To write about the advantages of the federal procedure over the present
state procedure under the Civil Practice Act would be useless. In certain
instances the New York procedure has some merit, but on the whole, the
existing state procedure has few defenders, especially among those who are
well acquainted with the procedure in the federal courts. 6
The history of the rule-making power in New York State from the
7
colonial period to the present is set forth in the case of Hanna v. Mitchell.3
The Colony of New York in 1691 passed a statute quite similar to the one
being considered toda .3 8 It gave to the Supreme Court of the Colony the
power to make, order, and establish such rules and orders for the more
orderly practice and proceeding in their courts. This power was exercised
by the Supreme Court for 86 years before there was a legislature of the
State of New York. 9 Some of the rules of procedure promulgated by the
Supreme Court of New York as early as 1799 are still found in the present
code of this state.40 During the early history of this country the right to
promulgate rules of procedure was generally recognized as inherent in the
courts.41 The Supreme Court of the United States expressly recognized in
this early period that it had such power and did prescribe rules of procedure
42
to be used in federal courts.
men, five of whom were law school experts on procedural systems, and ten of whom
were
practicing lawyers with wide experience.
36The following is a statement made by Hon. William D. Mitchell:
"I have practiced law in many sections of the country, and have become familiar with
the systems of practice and procedure in many states, and I am sure it cannot be denied
that, while the New York Civil Practice Act and Rules have many good points, they
constitute the most complicated, rigid and difficult procedural system of any state of the
union." See Flynn, Regulating Procedure by Rules of Court (1941) 26 CORNELL, L. Q.
653, 663.
37202 App. Div. 504, 196 N. Y. Supp. 43 (1st Dep't 1922) where the court states that
"the power to make rules was inherent in the courts of Kings Bench, Common Pleas,
and Exchequer of England, and would have been conferred on the Supreme Court
without the express grant of such power contained in the act." For an approval of this
statement by the Court of Appeals see General Investment Co. v. Interborough Rapid
Transit, 235 N. Y. 133, 143, 139 N,E. 216, 220 (1923). See MacDonald, A Survey of the

Administration of Justice h; New York (1941) 26 CORNELL L. Q. 648; Flynn, Regulating
Procedure
By Court Rules (1941) 26 CORNELL L. Q. 653.
3

8Hanna v. Mitchell, 202 App. Div. 504, 507, 196 N. Y. Supp. 43, 47 (1st Dep't 1922).
513, 196 N. Y. Supp. at 51.
Pound, Regulation of Judicial Procedure by Rules of Court (1915)' 10 ILL. L. REy.
163,
172.
41
People v. Callopy, 358 Ill.
11, 192 N. E. 634 (1934). See note 37 supra. See also
891d. at
40

Pound, supra note 40, at 170; Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure
are
4 2Void Conslitutionally (1928) 23 ILL. L. Rxv. 276.

"Rule," 2 Dall. 411, 413, 1 L. ed. 436 (U. S.1792).
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Field's Code adopted in New York in 184843 was the first endeavor by any
legislature to prescribe in detail the procedure to be used in the courts.
This original code contained only 391 sections and had many good qualities.
Twenty-eight years later the Throop Code of Civil Procedure was adopted.4"
This was a collection in one code of all of the law governing New York
procedure. The passage of this code, which attempted to regulate all of the
details of practice, was opposed by David Dudley Field who did not believe
in such detailed regulation of court procedure. 45 By revision and amendment
this code grew to 3,383 sections containing a conglomeration of both substantive and adjective law."
In 1904 the state legislature set up the Board of Statutory Consolidation
with Judge Rodenbeck as chairman. 47 The Board was given the task of consolidating and revising all of the law then in force. Believing that something more than consolidation and revision of the Code of Civil Procedure
was needed, the Board concentrated on the revision of the substantive law.48
The New York State Bar. Association, acting in response to speeches by
Judge Rodenbeck 49 and Elihu Root,50 at their annual meeting in 1911 resolved to submit to the legislature a provision calling for the consolidation,
revision, and simplification of the civil practice into a short practice act of
fundamental rules to be supplemented by rules of court.51 Although the legislature passed the provision, it was vetoed by the governor.5 2 Later, in 1913,
a similar provision was passed and the task was given to the Board of Statu53

tory Consolidation.

43N. Y. Laws 1848, c. 379.
44N. Y. Laws 1876, c. 448-449 entitled "The Code of Remedial Justice," amended by

and designated as "The Code of Civil Procedure" by N. Y. Laws 1877, c. 416; suppleby N. Y. Laws 1880, c. 178.
mented
45
Rodenbeck, The Reform of the Procedure in the Courts (1911) 34 N. Y. S. BaR
Ass'N Rz'. 354, 359:
"David Dudley Field was one of the most strenuous opponents of the Code of
Civil Procedure, and could find no language strong enough to express his condenmnation of the act. On one occasion he said it was an 'attempt to force upon the people
of this state a meretricious and abortive scheme which will keep you in perpetual
trouble which will never have an end."'
46Note (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 904, 906.
47N. Y. Laws 1904, c. 664.
4
SRodenbeck, The Reform of the Procedure in the Courts of the State of New York
(1911) 34 N. Y. S. BAR Ass'N RzP. 354, 355.
49Ibid.
5ORoot, Reform of Procedure (1911) 34 N. Y. S. BAR Ass'N REP. 87.
34 N. Y. S. BAR Ass'N REP. 468.
51(1911)
52Report of the Special Committee on the Revision of the Civil Practice (1912) 35
N. Y. S. Ba Ass'N REP. 437.
5N. Y. Laws 1913, c. 713. See also N. Y. Laws 19i2, c. 393.
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Two years later the Board submitted its recommendations." In place of
the Code of Civil Procedure it recommended a short practice act of 71
sections containing only the essential elements and a body of 401 rules, an
Evidence Law, a Cost Fees, Disbursements and Interest Law, and a Civil
Rights Law. This was expected to provide a simple, uniform, and flexible
system of procedure, freeing the judiciary from fixed statutory rules and
technical statutory construction. 55
While this report was before the state legislature, the Constitutional Convention of 1915 adopted as a part of the revised state constitution a provision making it a duty of the legislature to act upon the report of the Board
of Statutory Consolidation. It also provided:
"After the adoption of the Civil Practice Rules by the legislature
...the power to alter and amend such rules and to make, alter, and
amend 57civil practice rules shall vest and remain in the Courts of the
State."
Because of other considerations this Constitution was not adopted by the
people of the state at the general election in November 1915 when submitted
for their ratification.
The legislature sent the short practice act to a joint Legislative Committee for action.58 The committee members, who were opposed to a short practice act and court rules,5 9 proceeded to correct the more glaring defects in
the Code of Civil Procedure by a consolidation, revision, and simplification
of its provisions. This revised code, later known as the Civil Practice Act,60
consisted of 1,560 sections and was supplemented by 216 rules. 61
5

4REPORT OF THE BOARD OF STATUTORY CONSOLIDATION ON THE SIMPLIFICATION OF THE

CIvn PRACTICE OF NEv YoaK (1915)
55
Rodenbeck, The New Practice in
56

Vol. 1.
New York (1916) 1 CORNELL L. Q. 63, 68.
Note (1920) 29 YALE L. J.904, 905.
57Ibid.
r8Ibid.
59Report of the Committee to Examine the Practice Act prepared by the Board of
Statutory Consolidation and the Joint Legislative Committee (1920) 43 N. Y. S. BAR
Ass'N REP. 149. At page 151 this report quotes from the Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to the Legislature under the date of April 17, 1919:

"The Committee can see no special merit in a short practice act as such, which merely

declared the policy of the state, nor has the committee been particularly impressed
by the bitter denunciation of the Code on account of its size....
"Statutory technicalities tend to defeat justice by increasing the delays of litigation
and in numerous cases the cost of litigation to the honest litigant. On the other hand,
uncertainty resulting from too few statutory requirements and too elastic a system of
practice work just as great hardship in the individual case."
60N. Y. Laws 1920, c. 925.
61
In 1921 the Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted by a convention called for
the purpose upon the authority of N. Y. Laws 1920, c. 902.
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The New York State Bar Association, knowing that the Joint Legislative Committee had the power to put through their own code,6 2 in a last
minute attempt to save the short practice act, introduced a bill 63 in the legislature on kpril 7, 1920 providing that both plans be submitted to a convention made up of delegates from the Appellate Division, the Bar Association,
and members of both the Joint Legislative Committee and the Board of
Statutory Consolidation. The Joint Legislative Committee was able to shelve
this recommendation and obtain approval of their practice act.6 4
When the bills containing the Committee's new practice act were presented to Governor Smith, he requested the advice of the New York State
Bar Association. Judge Rodenbeck urged the Bar Association to advise the
Governor to veto the new practice act. He said:
"It does not seem to me that we ought at this time, after so'many
years of study on this subject, to sacrifice principle to expediency . ..
I say that we cannot afford to throw away the principle of regulating
details of practice by court rules ... "1-5
Faced with the problem of whether to insist upon the attainment of an
ideal,. or accept what the legislature offered, the Bar Association accepted
the opportunity to improve conditions immediately and passed the resolution advising the Governor to approve the new practice ac't. 66 The Governor
approved the bills and the Civil Practice Act became law.
The Practice Act has been criticized from the beginning. 67 It has admirable features, but it is altogether too long, with too much detail, too many
traps for the unwary, and with too much emphasis on forms and modes of
,procedure. It is lacking in recognition of the fact that in the administration
of justice enforcement ,of rules of practice is not the end in view.68 That
it is not adequate is evidenced by the habitual legislative tinkering which is
required to keep it in service. In 1934 the Judicial Council was set up to
make continuous studies of the judicial process, including court organization, jurisdiction, administration, procedure, and evidence.6 On the basis
62(1920) 43 N. Y. S. BAR Ass''r REP. 144-163, 301-203.
63

No. 1857, April 7, 1920.

64(1921) 44 N. Y. S. BAR Ass'N REP. 530.
65(1921) 44 N. Y .S.
BAR Ass'N REP. 532, 544.
66d.
at 546.
7

6 Rothschild, The Simplification of Civil Practice in New York (a series of articles)
(1923) 23 CoL. L. REv. 618, (1923) 23 CoL. L. Rv. 732, (1924) 24 CoL. L.

REv.

732,

(1924) 24 COL. L. REv. 815. Rothschild felt that the Civil Practice Act was not a
revision of our practice, but an amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure, introducing
specific changes on specific subjects and allocating statutory law on various topics into
what was considered more closely related ,subject matter.
6sSee Mitchell, Reform in Judicial Procedure (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 197.
69N. Y. JuDIcIARY LAW §§ 4048.
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of its studies it was to make recommendations to the legislature. At the
end of the first ten years, the Judicial Council reported that it had recommended changes to 263 sections of the Civil Practice Act.70 It also reported
that 342 changes to the Civil Practice Act had been effected. 71
The New York Civil Practice Act as it exists today, supplemented by
Rules of Civil Procedure, offers the best example of the defect of having
procedural codes enacted by legislatures. 72
Today twenty-three states of the union have adopted a statute giving their
highest court rule-making power. 73 Many others are considering the matter.
The English courts have been operating under court rules since 1873 with
great benefit to the litigant, secured by the expedition in settlement of controversies and the elimination of appeals on practice and pleading.74

There is no substantial question as to the constitutionality of the proposed
act. 75 The passage' of the enabling act in this state might be opposed by
70JUDICIAL COUNCIL, INDEX TO FIRST TEN ANNUAL

REPORTS

(1945)

27.

7'Id.
at 23.
72
73

See Mitchell, Reform in Judicial Procedure (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 197.

Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine,
Maryland, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
See Eleventh Annual Report of the Judicial Council, Proposal Under Consideration by
the Judicial Coumcil to Empower the Court of Appeals to Make Riles of Civil Pro(1945) 321, 329.
cedure
74 Taft, The Delays of the Law (1908) 18 YALE L. J.28, 32; Taft, Possible and Needed
Reforms in the Administration of Justice in the Federal Courts (1922)- 47 A. B. A. REP.
250, 260-269; Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts (1926) 12 A. B. A. J.599;
Paul,
5 The Rde Making Power of the Court (1925) 1 WASH. L. REv. 163, 169.

7 The relevant sections of the New York Constitution involved are Article III, Sec.

1, which provides: "The legislative power of this state shall be vested in the Senate
and Assembly," and Article VI, Section 20, -which provides:
"The testimony in equity cases shall be taken in like manner as in cases at law; and,
except as herein otherwise provided, the legislature shall have the same power to alter
and regulate the jurisdiction and proceedings in law and equity that it has heretofore
exercised."
At most Section 20 grants to the legislature the power to pass laws to the extent
"heretofore exercised" regulating practice and procedure. It does not purport to take
away the right of the courts, as part of their judicial work, to- pass rules governing
practice and procedure particularly where the legislature abstains from so doing. Nor
is there anything expressed in the Constitution which prevents or prohibits the legislature from delegating to the Court of Appeals complete rule making authority, especially
where such rules are still subject to legislative action. Hanna v. Mitchell, 202 App. Div.
504, 196 N. Y. Supp. 43 (1st Dep't 1922), aff'd, 235 N. Y. 534, 139 N. E. 724 (1923) ;
General Investment Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 235 N. Y. 133, 139 N. E.
216 (1923).
In Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet. 329 (U. S.1835) at 360, the court, through Mr. Justice
Story said, referring to earlier cases:
"It was there held that this delegation of power by Congress was perfectly constitutional; that the power to alter and add to the processes and modes of proceeding in a
suit embraced the whole progress of such suit, and every transaction in it from its com-

.
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legislators who desire to retain this control for themselves. To overcome
this possible objection, the bill requires that the rules must be laid before
the legislature during a full session with an opportunity on the part of the
legislature to veto or modify them before they become effective. It may be
that the strongest opposition to this proposed reform will come from lawyers
who understand the present system, are accustomed to working under it, and
feel that it would be a great burden to learn another entirely different procedure. In part this objection is overcome by the fact that with the Federal
Rules as.an example and starting point, it might be assumed that the court
rules which would be adopted for use in the state courts would be so nearly
identical to the rules in force in the federal courts that the lawyer practicing
in this state would only be required to be familiar with one procedure rather
than two, as is now the case with lawyers whose work carries them into the
federal courts.
The actual drafting of the rules, themselves will be a tremendous undertaking. However, the Court of Appeals would not be expected to do the
actual drafting. As was done by the Supreme Court, 76 an advisory committee would have to be appointed, composed of members of the bench and
bar, including judges of the lower courts. Perhaps this committee would
work through, or in conjunction with, the judicial Council. That agendy
has so many other problems to deal with that it might be well not to burden
it with the original drafting of the rules. However, some permanent advisory committee should be retained after the rules become effective so that
adequate reports on the operation of the rules will be available to the court
and further changes can be studied and recommended for adoption to keep
the rules adequate to their purpose. 7 7 The task of the Court of Appeals is
mencement to its termination, and until the judgment should be satisfied .... ."And
it was emphatically laid down that a general superintendence over this subject seems to
be properly within the judicial province and has always been so considered." See Bank
of U. S. v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 51 (U. S. 1825) ; Woodbury v. Andrew Jergens Co.,
61 F. (2d) 736 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), cert. denied, 289 U. S. 740, 53 Sup. Ct. 659 (1933) ;
Byers v. Smith, 4 Cal. (2d) 209, 47 P. (2d) 705 (1934); It re Constitutionality of
Statute empowering Supreme Court to promulgate Rules Regulating Pleading, Practice and Procedure in Judicial Proceedings, 204 Wisc. 501, 236 N. W. 717 (1931) ; State
of New Mexico v. Roy, 40 N. M. 397, 60 P. (2d) 646 (1936) ; State ex rel FosterWyman Lumber Co. v. Superior Court of Kings County, 148 Wash. 1, 267 Pac.
770 6 (1928).
7 See note 34 supra.
77
Sunderland, The Regulation of Practice and Procedure by Rules of Court (1942)
15 0no BAR Ass'xq RaP. 91, 97; Eleventh Annual Report of the Judicial Council,
Proposal under Considerationby the Judicial Council to Empower the Court of Appeals
to Make Rules of Civil Procedure (1945) 321, 334.
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merely to consider the draft when prepared, and if there are differences of
opinion to act as judge.
As stated at the outset, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Model Code of Evidence by the American Law Institute provide models
from which rules may be drawn. The best features of each should be adapted to New York procedure, and the best features of our own practice should
be retained.
Before his death Chief Judge Lehman expressed the opinion that rulemaking power should be vested in the New York courts although he reserved his judgment as to which New York courts should exercise the
power. 78
This proposed statute has been endorsed by the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York and the New York County Lawyers Association. It
is also supported by the Citizens Committee on the Courts which is composed
of lawyers and laymen of both political parties.
78

See Report of Committee on Courts of Superior jurisdiction on Proposed Statute

Delegating to the Court of Appeals the Rule-Making Power, Association of the Bar
of the City of New York. This committee voted in favor of the proposed statute.
With respect to the attitude of the late Chief Judge, the report states: "A representative of this committee, with a representative of the New York County Lawyers Association, conferred recently with Chief Judge Lehman of the Court of Appeals with refer-

ence to the proposed bill. At the conference Judge Lehman gave these representatives

permission to quote his remarks, which were, in substance, that he was enthusiastically
in favor of vesting the rule-making power in the Courts rather than in the Legislature.
judge Lehman had not given consideration at that time to the question of whether the
rule-making power should be vested in the highest Court of the State, as has been done
in other States and as is done under the Federal statute, or in the Appellate Divisions,
and hence made no comment one way or the other with respect to that feature of the bill."

